The West Virginia Lawyer
October 1996 Issue
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| Dean's Column | Letters to the Editor |
| YLS Section | Feature Articles |
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PRESIDENT'S PAGE
Mentoring
I recently attended my first meeting as a member of the Visiting Committee of the College of Law,
and during the course of the Committee's interviews of law students, a number of students
expressed concern about where they would find answers to the types of problems they expected to
encounter as they entered the practice of law, fearing that their education had focused too much on
theory and too little on practice. This is the age-old struggle faced by law school deans everywhere
in trying to build a curriculum that strikes the right balance between theory and practice. The
students' comments rekindled memories of my own such fears as I entered private practice fifteen
years ago.
Although the firm which I joined upon graduation was small (four lawyers), there was a wealth of
experience. In fact, the combined years of experience of those lawyers was nearly 100 years and I
took great comfort in knowing that as I began to learn how to be a lawyer, I had that depth of
experience from which to draw. Nearly daily I tapped the resource of that experience for
everything from how to find the courthouse to basic drafting questions, to advice about how to
handle the hostile court-appointed criminal client who felt that his lawyer was nothing more than
another part of the system out to stick it to him.
As the years passed, my own experiences contributed to the experience of the firm, and although
the firm evolved, as all firms do, the collective experience remains a great asset. To practice law
without this asset would be as difficult as riding a bike without handlebars - there would be
momentum, but no direction.
Several months ago in my article relating to Lawyer Discipline, I indicated that approximately 73%
of all ethical complaints are filed against solo practitioners. Many of these complaints relate to
matters that might have been avoided had the offending lawyer had the resource of an experience
pool. By virtue of the changing legal economy, many lawyers, both new and not so new, are
opening up solo practices or associating with other lawyers who have left larger, more specialized
practices. These lawyers need guidance and assistance in matters relating, not only to new issues in
areas of law, but equally important issues of law practice and systems management and matters
relating to the difficult client. What does a solo practitioner or small firm lawyer do when there is no
experience from which to draw the resources needed for a successful law practice? The first part of
the answer is simple - ask someone. Who to ask is often a more difficult answer, and not knowing
who to ask may cause some lawyers not to ask for help when they need it. The Solo and General
Practitioners Committee of your State Bar has proposed, and the Board of Governors has
adopted, the creation of a Mentor/Advisor Program to take the difficulty out of the second part of
that question. With your cooperation and support, the Mentor/Advisor Program will help eliminate
the dilemma faced by many lawyers in not knowing where to turn to ask for guidance.
As with the wife-husband relationship or the physician-patient relationship, communication is the
bridge that makes the relationship viable. Communicating with other members of the profession
when questions arise is an absolute necessity to a successful law practice. Communicating with
colleagues who have volunteered to serve as mentors or advisors can be vitally important for the
lawyer struggling with a problem for which he or she has no answer. Whether the problem be one
of relating to a substantive issue of law, a law practice or management problem relating to an office
system or the mechanics of operating a trust account, or an attorney-client problem or dispute, not
asking for help when help is needed can be a disastrous mistake. It is the hope of your Bar that the
Mentor/Advisor Program will provide an experience for every lawyer in the State. With your
support, the Bar will develop this support system for those lawyers to whom that source of
information is not available. Many of you, whether seasoned solo practitioners or members of a
large firm, can offer tremendous support to your fellow lawyers simply by agreeing to be available
to offer advice and guidance.
This program will provide an opportunity for many lawyers to make a contribution to the
betterment of our profession merely by agreeing to be available to answer questions and offer
guidance should they become contacted by a fellow lawyer in needing assistance. Simple
communication of ideas and insight from one's own experience can be a significant contribution to
our profession.
If I might borrow an oft quoted line from the movie Cool Hand Luke - AWhat we have here is the
failure to communicate. Failing to communicate usually ends in failure. Your participation in the
Mentor Program will help avoid failure and improve the practice of law for many West Virginia
lawyers by adding a resource not otherwise available.
To become a Mentor, simply contact the State Bar and indicate the areas in which you are willing
to serve. It will be a great contribution, not only to our profession, but to the public we serve as
well.
DEAN'S COLUMN
Introducing College Of Law New Faculty and Adjuncts
Two new faculty members join the College of Law during the 1996-97 academic year, and it is my
pleasure to introduce them to the members of the West Virginia Bar.
During the past decade, the College of Law has benefitted greatly from the teaching and intellectual
stimulation provided by the distinguished visiting faculty members who have served as occupants of
the William J. Maier, Jr. Chair of Law. Visiting Maier Chairs have enhanced the curricular offerings
and enriched the students and faculty by their expertise and experience. Professor Gary Minda, a
faculty member at Brooklyn Law School will occupy this chair for the 1996-97 academic year.
Professor Minda earned M.A. and J.D. degrees from Wayne State University. In law school, he
was a member of the law review board of editors and graduated magna cum laude. He held a
federal clerkship for the Honorable Ralph M. Freeman in Detroit for two years, and entered law
teaching at Brooklyn in 1978. An insightful, provocative and prolific scholar, he is the author of
more than 25 law review articles and book chapters in the areas of Labor Law, Law and Literature
and Jurisprudence. His book, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's
End was published in 1995. At WVU, Professor Minda will teach Administrative Law, Law and
Economics, and a seminar in Postmodern Legal Movements.
Professor Judith. M. Scully has developed expertise in many areas, including trial practice and
criminal law and procedure - courses she will teach at the College of Law. She earned a B.A.
degree from George Washington Law Center in 1986. Professor Scully brings to the law school a
wealth and depth of experience in both civil and criminal practice. She served as a clerk for the
Women's Legal Defense Fund in Washington D.C., and a legislative assistant for the Chicago City
Council. She worked as the Deputy Director of the City of Chicago Board of Ethics for two years,
and engaged in private practice for almost three years, focusing on general civil, corporate and
complex litigation. Since 1991, she has been a sole practitioner, providing representation to criminal
defendants in state and federal cases, and to plaintiffs in race and sex discrimination cases. While in
practice, she also served as a hearing officer for the Cook County Commission on Human Rights
for three years, and as an arbitrator in the Cook County Mandatory Arbitration Program for six
years.
Professor Scully has authored several papers and delivered over 100 lectures on criminal law, civil
rights law, international human rights, and many other topics. She was one of 16 recipients of the
AWomen's Leadership award presented in 1995 by the Chicago Women in Philanthropy. Her
professional and community endeavors are many and varied, and include service as National
Conference of Black Lawyers Social & Political Co-Chair and a member of the Chicago Women's
Health Center Collective.
A number of adjunct law professors will enhance the College of Law next year. These lawyers
devote untold numbers of hours to class preparation and instruction, and their expertise and insight
provide an invaluable perspective to WVU's faculty and students.
Classes taught by adjunct professors during the Fall semester include: Estate Planning, William T.
Belcher, Steptoe & Johnson (Clarksburg); Coal, Oil and Gas, J. Thomas Lane, Bowles, Rice,
McDavid, Graff & Love (Charleston); Estate and Gift Tax, Raymond P. Parker, Eckert Seamans
Cherin & Mellott (Pittsburgh). During the Spring semester, adjunct offerings include: Business
Planning, James W. Forsyth, Buchanan Ingersoll Professional Corporation (Pittsburgh); Energy
Law (seminar), Charles H. Seehorn, Morgantown Energy Technology Center (Morgantown);
Health Care Regulations (seminar), Dr. Daniel R. Sullivan, M.D.
In the skills area, five adjuncts will each teach a section of Appellate Advocacy: Ellen R. Archibald,
West Virginia Insurance Commission (Charleston); Paul R. Cranston, sole practitioner
(Morgantown); Thomas J. Gillooly, sole practitioner (Charleston); William S. Mattingly, Jackson &
Kelly (Charleston); Harry M. Rubenstein, Kay, Casto, Chaney, Love & Wise (Morgantown).
Assisting in the College of Law Clinic will be Brian McAuliffe, West Virginia Legal Services Plan
(Clarksburg); Susan McLaughlin, McLaughlin & Curry (Fairmont); Randy Minor, Appalachian
Center for Law and Public Service (Morgantown); and Bob Richardson, West Virginia Legal
Service Plan (Morgantown). Susan K. McLaughlin, Monongalia Circuit Judges, The Honorable
Robert Stone and The Honorable Larry Starcher, along with Laurence M. Schultz, Burke &
Schultz (Martinsburg) will work with Professor Chuck DiSalvo in the Fall semester Trial Advocacy
program.
I am delighted to recognize these adjunct law professors, and thank them sincerely for their
generous contributions to legal education.
Second Annual Golf Benefit. There is still time to sign up for the College of Law's second annual
golf outing on Friday, October 25. Proceeds will be used to support College of Law programs.
This year's event will be played at The Pines Country Club in Morgantown. Lunch and registration
are at noon, and the shotgun tee-off time is 1:00 p.m. The tournament will be played by the two
best of four balls, and four net and two gross team prizes will be awarded. All players will receive
tee-gifts. Golfers will be invited to attend a post-game reception at my home, and for a nominal
cost, the Dean's Partner's Dinner. The next day, October 26, is the Miami game, making October
25-26 an opportune time for a trip to Morgantown. An entry form, including further information, is
included in this issue of The West Virginia Lawyer. Send this form and your entry fee back today. I
look forward to seeing you at the Pines!
YLS SECTION
Feline Frenzy
I received a number of comments regarding my August article. My mother-in-law thanks you. I am
pleased to report that we found Rush Kitty alive and well, but unfortunately, he was clean shaven.
Since Rush Kitty is a Himalayan, his drastically changed appearance prompted my wife to rename
him Oscar (like the Sesame Street character). In any event, Oscar is fine, and his hair will grow
back, eventually.
As election day rapidly approaches, the advertisements of the presidential candidates have already
begun to inundate the media. The coverage is so pervasive that even my dreams which are not
nightmares contain the grinning faces of Bill Clinton and Bob Dole (Ross Perot is still reserved
solely for nightmares). The wild charges and counter-charges of the various candidates, however,
are stark reminders of the necessity of keeping legal advertising as dignified as possible. I do not
question the right of attorneys and firms to exercise free speech, but the quality and dignity of legal
advertising reflects upon the profession as a whole. Attorneys have a shared responsibility to leave
the profession no worse than they find it, but sadly, this is not always the case.
. . .
Having stated my position on legal advertising, I will now shamelessly promote the many and varied
legal aids which are available through the Young Lawyers Section. Using the order form located on
or near this page, you may still reserve your very own copy of the West Virginia Practice
Handbook (4th Edition). In addition, by using another form located on the same page, you may
also order Bowman's Ethics & Malpractice Alert newsletter, published by Professor Jack Bowman
of the West Virginia University College of Law. Both the Practice Handbook and the Bowman
newsletter are invaluable resources which should be found in every law office in the State.
In the near future, the YLS hopes to being publication of a handbook prepared by the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia which is designed as a basic
guide to assist attorneys who do not normally practice before the Bankruptcy Court. This
handbook will soon be made available at moderate cost to anyone who desires a copy, but please
do not attempt to order one at this time.
Finally, we are still looking for volunteers to write chapters or sub-chapters for the Solo
Practitioner's Handbook. If you are interested in helping with this important project, please call
YLS Treasurer, Reggie Osenton at (304) 752-6296. Reggie can provide you with a proposed
table of contents for the handbook, and we would profoundly appreciate any assistance which you
are willing to provide.
Bar Committee Corrections
As corrections to the listing of Bar Committee members that appeared in the August issue of The
West Virginia Lawyer, the following additions should be made:
James Cargas - Charleston - Natural Resources, Land Use and Evironmental Law Committee
Norwood Bentley - Martinsburg - Budget Committee
In addition, there were a few mispellings of Committee members' names as well as the incorrect
inclusion of Edward Rebrook as a member of the Criminal Law Committee. We regret these errors
which occurred in the listing of the hundreds of State Bar members who volunteer their time and
effort to participating in the important work of the State Bar.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
UNLICENSED TO KILL: INSURING DISASTER
As an attorney and new resident of West Virginia, I heard stories . . . ADrive defensively . . .
people don't have insurance. And, as a typical American I kind of shrugged it off. Uninsured, drunk
drivers are people who hit others. It will never happen to me.
I read the surveys. Ninety-two percent of high school seniors have used alcohol at some time. In
Arkansas, seventy-five percent of them admit to drinking and driving on a regular basis. It's a
growing problem in our state and nation. Local officials have tried to combat it by an attempt at
convincing lawmakers to lower the state's legal limit from .10 to .08. This move died in the last
legislative session with the House Judiciary Committee. Even though uninsured motorist coverage
requirements are in place, there is a void here. But statistics seem so cold and we don't seem to
have the time to discuss such matters apart from boardroom lunches and the like.
On July 13, 1996, my wife and I experienced firsthand what MADD is so mad about. We were on
Route 77 traveling back from a gospel concert in Bluefield. We had been state residents for only
six weeks and it was the first time we had been out past nine thirty at night. As we talked about the
good time we had had, we saw what appeared to us and others to be a deer darting across the
road. But we and witnesses were wrong. What seemed to be an innocent creature was in fact a
driver without headlights. His blood-alcohol level was .19 according to police officials.
Before we knew it, he had crossed over his lanes, the median and our lanes. I awoke some eight
hours later in the hospital with no memory of the crash, not to mention a concussion, bruised
sternum and various other injuries. My wife had also been hurt. But the real shock was yet to
come.
As I delved into the laws of West Virginia I soon found out there were issues which seemed a bit
more pressing than the financial feasibility of Tamarack. The one entity which did the most damage
to us was the State. No, it was not the fine state troopers. I discovered that in West Virginia, one
can purchase auto insurance, drop their coverage, get drunk and cause harm. And, if the insurance
company does inform the DMV of the non-coverage, the system of processing that information is
backed up about six months. This ultimately gives the so called non-licensed a grace period of
death; a legally approved stamp to slap citizens in the face, not to mention out-of-staters who do
not have their own insurance for some reason or another.
It is odd that a state which so penalizes insurance companies for wrongful cancellation or
non-renewal of liability policies, is in such disarray. According to West Virginia Code Section
33-6A-1, insurers must have one of seven valid reasons to do so. And, Section 17D-2A-5
requires companies to inform the DMV within ten days or face penalties. But the key is that these
laws place the responsibility on the insurer alone for wrongful or malicious conduct. They do not
cover the insured who cancels his or her policy, only to cause pain and suffering to others in the
process. This so called period of grace is a disgrace. It gives protection to no one nor does it
prevent harm. In its attempt to put a stop to problems, hasn't the legislature set up a redtape
roadblock with its own policies.
As mentioned previously, I am fairly new to this State. However, everyone I have spoken to in law,
insurance and other industries agree . . . West Virginia has to affirmatively end this nightmare on the
roadways. How many lives must be lost until we realize this? My wife and I are blessed. Next time,
I'm not so sure. I love my new State. But not enough to die for it. At least not needless death.
change must occur for all of our good.
Robert N. Diotalevi, Esq.
Beaver, West Virginia
Editor's Note:
The following letter, written by Ms. Leanne Barrett of Morgantown, is a Athank you@ to the State
Bar for her selection as the recipient of the State Bar Merit Scholarship for the 1996-97 academic
school year. Each year a student entering the WVU College of Law is chosen to received the
scholarship based upon undergraduate academic success and other achievements. Ms. Barrett
received her Bachelor of Arts in English from WVU in 1974 and has been employed with the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health in Morgantown, since graduation. As an
undergraduate she was named to the Dean's List and the President's List. We are very pleased to
present her with the scholarship and wish her much success with her legal studies.
Dear Mr. Tinder:
It was a pleasure meeting you during the College of Law's Orientation. I wanted to extend my
sincere thanks again to the West Virginia State Bar and to all those who participated in the
selection process. I am already realizing the benefits of receiving this scholarship, and I am honored
to have been selected. I am very excited about the next three years and practicing law in the state
of West Virginia. Hopefully our paths will cross again someday.
Leanne M. Barrett
LEGAL ASSISTANTS OF WEST VIRGINIA, INC.
By Alicia E. Watts, Certified Legal Assistant
What is a Certified Legal Assistant? In 1976, the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
(NALA), with which Legal Assistants of West Virginia, Inc. (LAWV) is affiliated, began offering a
voluntary certification program for legal assistants through its Certifying Board. The Certifying
Board of NALA consists of a minimum of five legal assistants, two attorneys, and two paralegal
educators. Certified Legal Assistant (CLA) must have completed a two-day comprehensive
examination and, thereafter, periodically present evidence of continuing legal education to NALA's
Certifying Board to maintain the Certification. Currently, there are 37 Certified Legal Assistants in
the State of West Virginia, and 7,889 Certified Legal Assistants in the United States.
The CLA examination contains seven sections of testing: Communications, Ethics, Judgment and
Analytical Ability, Human Relations and Interviewing Techniques, Legal Research, Legal
Terminology, and Substantive Law. Communications tests the legal assistant on word usage,
grammar, and non-verbal communication. Ethics tests the legal assistant on the unauthorized
practice of law, confidentiality, and his/her knowledge of the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility and NALA's Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Human
Relations and Interviewing Techniques tests the legal assistant on interviewing techniques and
his/her working and social relationships with employers, clients, co-workers, and the public.
Judgment and Analytical Ability tests the legal assistant on reading comprehension and his/her
ability to analyze facts and evidence. Legal Research tests the legal assistant's use of state and
federal codes, statutes, digests, legal encyclopedias, court reports, and shepardizing and
researching procedures. Legal Terminology tests the legal assistant's use and understanding of Latin
phrases and legal terms. The seventh section, Substantive Law, is further divided into eleven areas
of federal law: General, Bankruptcy, Corporate, Probate, Estate Planning, Contract, Litigation,
Real Estate, Tax, Criminal, and Administrative Law. Each examinee is required to take the General
Law section, and choose four of the ten remaining areas of law on which he/she wants to be tested.
The examinees must score at least seventy percent (70%) on the Communications, Ethics,
Judgment and Analytical Ability, Human Relations and Interviewing Techniques, Legal Research,
and Legal Terminology sections, and score 350, out of a possible 500, points on the Substantive
Law section, to successfully complete NALA's Certified Legal Assistant examination.
After a legal assistant has successfully completed the exam, he/she must complete 50 hours (5
units) of continuing legal education every five years to maintain the CLA status.
NALA's Certified Legal Assistant examination has encouraged legal assistants to continue their
education, has promoted the profession of legal assistants, and has educated the public for the
advancement of the profession. LAWV offers various seminars and monthly regional educational
presentations which allow Certified Legal Assistants to maintain their status. For more information
regarding the CLA examination, contact Cheryl Given, CLA, the NALA/CLA Liaison for LAWV,
at (304) 636-3560, or NALA at (918) 587-6828. For information regarding LAWV's seminars
and monthly regional educational presentations, contact Andrea Rayfield, President, at (304)
529-3258.
About the Author: Ms. Watts is a certified legal assistant
MEDIATION FROM DEFENDANT'S
(AND MEDIATOR'S) PERSPECTIVE
By Robert G. Steele, Esq.
In a recent issue of the West Virginia Lawyer, R. Edison Hill wrote of AMediation From a
Plaintiff's Perspective. While this article is from a different or opposite perspective, it reaches a very
similar conclusion.
Ed Hill concluded that plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel should use mediation as an appropriate
means to achieve a satisfactory result. Because parties have the ability to terminate the mediation
process at any time, there is little to lose by mediating except for the time involved. Even if a
settlement is not achieved, both parties learn about the key issues and usually move closer to a
resolution which may occur subsequent to the mediation. From the perspective of defendants'
counsel, those same benefits exist.
As a mediator, it is my experience that claimants and plaintiffs become more involved in the
mediation process than defendants and insurance carriers. There is a well-known fable that both
pigs and chickens are interested in the basic American breakfast of ham and eggs. However, while
chickens are very interested, pigs are totally committed. Truly, mediation is a ham and egg situation.
If the defendants can be equated to the chicken in that equation, they are very interested in the
mediation process. When the mediation works out, they are happy to have contributed to the
process and another claim has been removed from their busy schedule. However, if the mediation
does not resolve the claim, defendants and insurance carriers simply go on to the next claim, or
business as usual. On the other hand, the plaintiffs or claimants, once they participate in the
process, are totally involved and become the equivalent of the pig in the ham and egg equation.
Having heard this lengthy process may be resolved, they become totally committed and usually
work very hard to come to some resolution. Their only alternative, if the mediation process does
not work, is to return to the lengthy, time consuming and uncertain process of awaiting their one
and only day in court. There is a lyric in the country song entitled, AToday I Started Loving You
Again@ which describes the plight of the plaintiff: ANow I'm right back where I guess I've always
been. That is, awaiting my day in court.
It is almost without debate that under the present system, the only participants in the mediation
process who may have something to lose in addition to the time it takes to mediate, are the lawyers
of the defense bar. While few people would go as far as former Justice Neely in Poling v. Motorist
Mutual Ins. Co., 192 W.Va. 46, 450 S.E.2d 635 (1994) and Charles v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 192 W.Va. 293, 452 S.E.2d 384 (1994), there is some truth that an early resolution of
litigation for attorneys involved in defense work cuts off their opportunity to be paid for future
hourly services. For those attorneys who do not have a sufficient number of cases to defend, this
can be a matter of great concern.
However, even assuming that defense counsel must be dragged kicking and screaming to the
mediation opportunity, it is clear that they will be present. Insurance companies continually look for
ways to cut costs and the defense counsel who does not suggest opportunities for alternative
dispute resolution, including mediation, will soon be involved with fewer and fewer insurance
clients.
Frankly, both sides of the litigation equation should recognize that skilled and experienced
professionals can negotiate settlements which are at least more consistent, and perhaps fairer, than
six lay persons who have little experience and who often allow emotions to dictate an unusual or
surprising result. As all attorneys recognize, negotiated settlements eliminate the surprising verdicts
which are on both ends of the spectrum. Those are the verdicts which shock defendants and
plaintiffs alike. In addition, a settlement by mediation, or otherwise, eliminates the cost, delay and
surprise which often results from an appeal.
With the availability of mediation as provided by the West Virginia Supreme Court Rules, the
advent of Settlement Week in the Northern District and the use of mediation in the Southern
District, it will soon be the rare tort case in West Virginia which does not go to mediation. The
State Bar Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution has been training mediators for a number of
years. In addition, numerous commercial enterprises are available, and they are actively marketing
mediation to various organizations including insurance companies. These commercial groups have
panels of trained mediators who are often worth the money charged by the commercial service for
getting the parties together and providing the mediator.
In the article by Ed Hill, written from the plaintiff's perspective, it was stated, AThere is no
substitute for the defendant's insurance company claims representative meeting face to face with the
parties plaintiff, and their counsel, allowing personal evaluation of the plaintiffs, including but not
limited to an evaluation of a jury's likely reaction to their claims.
My early reaction as a defense attorney was that the personal participation by a representative of
the defendant's insurance company might be too expensive because of the ever increasing number
of mediations. However, having worked in the process for approximately nine years, I now agree
entirely with the position stated by Ed Hill. I believe that the benefits of engaging fully and
completely in the mediation process greatly outweigh any business interruption and any imposition
which may result to insurance companies. However, if the defendant and the defendant's insurance
carrier are not fully prepared to engage in the give and take of the process, mediation is not being
used to its potential. In fact, less than full participation can be counterproductive in that it may
poison further efforts to resolve the dispute.
From the standpoint of a mediator, it does not appear that insurance companies have determined
the best procedure to effectively engage in the mediation process. In order to provide some
uniformity in the settlement of claims and in order to be fair to claimants, insurance companies have
adopted a practice of having a committee evaluate more difficult claims. This is a laudatory practice
which substitutes a collective judgement for the judgment of a single claims person. There are times
when, if the evaluation process of the first committee does not resolve the claim and it appears
headed for jury trial, there will be a second committee or super committee which will review the
claim in order to determine whether an appropriate and fair offer has been made. Again, those
processes are appropriate and commendable on the part of the insurance industry. However, the
committee evaluation has tended to frustrate the mediation process because the representative sent
to the mediation meeting becomes merely a messenger of the committee's decision.
When a committee has already made a decision as to the value of a claim, they send a
representative to the mediation with authority to give a dollar amount. The representative is not
authorized to exceed that authority. As such, the representative becomes generally a message
carrier, unless the representative can negotiate a settlement for an amount less than the authorized
top dollar. Normally, the representative can contact a supervisor by telephone, but it is difficult to
summarize or capsulize the comments and events which occur in mediation by one or more
telephone conversations. As a result, it is terribly frustrating as a mediator to be told what a
committee has Aput on the claim@ and later find out that the committee has not taken into
consideration numerous facts and circumstances, both favorable and unfavorable, which might have
affected its decision in the evaluation process.
If insurance carriers send claims representatives to mediations without some latitude in handling the
process, the insurance industry is not giving itself the best opportunity to resolve claims through
mediation. It is submitted that a workable solution might be for the insurance carriers to adopt a
policy where the representative thoroughly discusses all facets of a claim before the mediation with
his superior or a committee. That person could then be given sufficient authority to make a decision
within a given range. The parameters of that range might be higher or lower than normal. In the
event the representative felt that it was appropriate to use the upper portion of the range or even to
exceed that range on the basis of the information exchanged during the mediation process, the
representative would be permitted to make that decision and later be required to explain and justify
to the supervisor or claims committee, the reason for the deviation from the normal range of
settlement. This may or may not be a good method of engaging in mediation or even a workable
solution, but I am certain that there are numerous other mechanisms by which insurance companies
could come to a mediation process better prepared to resolve disputes than presently is being
employed by some insurers.
I also agree with Ed Hill's comment from his article that, APlaintiff's counsel may be at fault for
allowing their clients to have unrealistic expectations as to the amount of a reasonable settlement.
Again, as a mediator, it often seems that plaintiff's counsel has a more realistic view than the plaintiff
about the value of the claim. It appears that in some instances, plaintiffs' counsel have expressed
great enthusiasm and optimism about a claim in the early stages and are then faced with a client
whose expectations must be lowered.
While plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel will find mediation to be an appropriate and effective tool for
the resolution of conflicts, they should not look upon it as a golden goose which will pay dividends
just because of an increased volume of case filings without regard to quality. While defendants and
insurance companies should participate fully and completely in the mediation process with
representatives who are fully empowered to make settlement decisions, there are times when it is
appropriate for a defendant to just say, ANo! One would have to be extremely naive to believe
that insurance fraud does not exist in today's society, or that claimant's do not exaggerate claims
from time to time.
In essence, both sides should use mediation as a good faith effort to arrive at a fair conclusion. The
savings should not come from any increase or decrease in the dollar amounts of mediated
settlements when compared to negotiated settlements and jury verdicts. The savings should come
from the reduction of court time, attorneys' fees and legal costs. In examining the dynamics of the
system as it exists today, the only loser in that system, as previously mentioned, may be the defense
bar. It is for that reason that I would propose that attorneys representing claimants should take a
second look at their contingency fee contracts. (Here, Ed Hill and I may start to disagree.)
Traditionally, such contingency fee contracts have included a lesser percentage fee if the claim is
settled before suit it filed, and a higher percentage fee after suit is filed. Some contracts have
included a third percentage fee if there is the necessity of an appeal. Because the mediation process
should be a win/win situation, it would promote settlements if the contingency fee contract were
generally changed to stipulate that the lower settlement percentage fee (or an intermediate
percentage fee) would be applicable if the claim were settled by mediation even after suit had been
pending for some time. It seems fair to lower the attorney fee if the risk of a contingency (losing at
trial) is eliminated.
While Ed Hill's article and this article have focused on mediation, other forms of alternative dispute
resolution should not be overlooked. Litigation itself is merely one form of dispute resolution, and
the trial of a civil action is but one example of a method by which disputes can be resolved. While it
is an improvement over hand to hand combat or walking across hot coals, parties who have
disputes should be alert to other means of resolution.
Arbitration is normally a quicker, simpler solution with a binding result. The major concern with
arbitration appears to be that because of the binding result, the parties have a difficult time in
agreeing upon or selecting one or more arbitrators. Some commercial companies are using a very
short arbitration procedure where each side submits its position in writing and the arbitrator makes
a decision based upon the submissions. The arbitrator is selected by the commercial service without
input from the litigants, but anyone selected as an arbitrator would be required to disclose any
possible conflict. This may be a reasonable procedure for small personal injury or property claims
where liability is not a significant issue. Arbitration is also a preferred alternative in cases which are
too complicated to present to a jury and where the parties can agree upon or select an arbitrator,
either through a commercial service or otherwise.
Major League Baseball uses a form or arbitration for salary disputes, which is commonly (and
cleverly) referred to as baseball arbitration. In that situation, each side submits information to an
arbitrator, either in writing or orally, and proposes a number as the suggested salary for the player
in question. Given the information by both sides and given the number submitted by each side, the
arbitrator then selects one of the two numbers believed to be the more appropriate. Such a form of
baseball arbitration can also be used at the conclusion of a mediation session. That is, if the
mediation has proven to be unsuccessful on a voluntary basis, the parties may agree to each submit
a number to the mediator who then becomes an arbitrator and selects one of the two numbers
suggested by the parties. The obligation to put forth a number tends to have a loosening effect on
the position of each side.
There is also a form of alternative dispute resolution known as mediation/arbitration (or med-arb)
which converts the mediator to an arbitrator at the conclusion of an unsuccessful mediation.
Frankly, this is not a particularly good option from a mediator's point of view because it sometimes
inhibits the mediator's ability to frankly discuss options during the mediation process. In addition,
the parties continue to posture during the mediation process in hopes of impressing the
mediator/arbitrator if the matter proceeds to the arbitration phase.
Another technique used at the conclusion of an unsuccessful mediation where the parties have come
reasonably close to settlement, is for the mediator to ask each party privately if they would like for
the mediator to suggest a settlement position. If both agree, a position is put forth to both parties
privately. If both parties accept or reject the position, the process simple. If one party accepts and
the other rejects the suggested outcome, the rejecting party is not told that the other party would
have accepted the suggested settlement position. There are a number of other alternative dispute
resolution possibilities which may be employed, such as mock trials, mini-trials, evaluative hearings,
etc.
While alternative dispute resolution and particularly mediation are in the growing and exploratory
stages in West Virginia, it seems that all sides stand to benefit from the process. Those benefits can
be enhanced if the parties will look for means to improve their full participation in these processes
and if the members of the West Virginia Bar look for opportunities to save court time and make
their clients the true benefactors of the process.
ADVISORY OPINION NO. 96-18
ISSUED BY THE WEST VIRGINIA ETHICS COMMISSION
MAY 2, 1996
OPINION SOUGHT
Is it a violation of the Ethics Act for government attorneys to handle pro bono cases for low income
citizens?
FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE COMMISSION
All attorneys who practice law in West Virginia must be members of the State Bar which, pursuant
to WV Code 51-1-4a(d), is part of the Judicial branch of State government serving as an
administrative agency for the Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia. Attorneys must also
comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Supreme Court.
One of those Rules requires that lawyers provide pro bono services. It states that:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. lawyer may discharge this responsibility by
providing professional services at no fee or at a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to
public service or charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law,
the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal
services to persons of limited means. Rule 6.1 Pro Bono publico service.
The official comment to this Rule states that:
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, should find time to
participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The
provision of free legal to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each
lawyer as well as the profession generally, but the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough
to meet the need. Thus, it has been necessary for the profession and government to institute
additional programs to provide legal services . . . Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to
meet this need for legal services.
The State Bar, in cooperation with private legal services programs in West Virginia, initiated a Pro
Bono Referral Project. This program requests that lawyers volunteer their time and efforts to assist
low income citizens with their civil legal problems. Presently, over seven hundred West Virginia
lawyers have agreed to handle at least one civil legal case per year on behalf of low income citizens
on a pro bono basis.
A State Bar representative inquires whether the Ethics Act would prohibit government lawyers
from giving their time and effort on a free basis to pro bono cases for low income persons.
PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELIED UPON BY THE COMMISSION
West Virginia Code 6B-2-5(f) provides, in pertinent part that: [n]o present or former elected or
appointed public official or public employee shall, during or after his or her public employment or
service, represent a client or act in a representative capacity with or without compensation on
behalf of any person in a contested case, rate-making proceeding, license or permit application,
regulation filing or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties which arose during his
or her period of public service or employment and in which he or she personally and substantially
participated in a decision-making, advisory or staff support capacity, unless the appropriate
government agency, after consultation, consents to such representation. staff attorney, accountant,
or other professional employee who has represented a government agency in a particular matter
shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or substantially related matter in which that
client's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the governmental agency, without the
consent of the governmental agency: Provided that this prohibition on representation shall not apply
when the client was not directly involved in the particular matter in which such professional
employee represented the government agency, but was involved only as a member of a class. . .
West Virginia Code 6B-2-5(g)(1) provides in pertinent part that. . .No full-time staff attorney or
accountant shall, during his or her public service or public employment or for a period of six months
after the termination of his or her public service or public employment with a governmental entity
authorized to hear contested cases or promulgate regulations, appear in a representative capacity
before the governmental entity in which he or she serves or served or is or was employed in the
following matters:
(A) A contested case involving an administrative sanction, action or refusal to act;
(B) To support or oppose a proposed regulation;
(C To support or contest the issuance or denial of a license or permit;
(D) A rate-making proceeding; and
(E) To influence the expenditure of public funds.
ADVISORY OPINION
The requester inquires whether government attorneys may spend time and effort providing pro
bono representation to low income individuals. As described by the requester, attorneys would
provide legal services and representation to low income individuals in this State on a pro bono
basis. The attorneys would provide such services without remuneration or compensation.
Pursuant to the Ethics Act, at WV Code 6B-2-5(b)(1), a public servant may not Ause his or her
office. . . for his or her own private gain or that of another person. However, this section contains a
proviso which affords that the Aperformance of usual and customary duties associated with the
office or position or the advancement of public policy goals or constituent services, without
compensation, does not constitute the use of prestige of office for private gain. (Emphasis added)
The Pro Bono Referral Project does not compensate participating attorneys and is intended to
advance the goal of providing access to legal services to those who would otherwise be unable to
afford representation. Therefore, such activities would not be considered a use of public office for
the private gain of another as set forth above.
This determination is supported by the legislative rules implementing the provision of the Ethics Act
on private gain. See 158 CSR Series 6. For example, 158 CSR 6-8 states only that public
employees Amay not receive private compensation for performing private work during public work
hours. As proposed by the requester, the pro bono activity would not result in private
compensation to the government attorneys.
Also, all lawyers must comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct, which are promulgated and
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals. Rule 6.1 mandates that Aa lawyer should render public
interest legal service. lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services at
no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or
organizations. Consequently, compliance with Rule 6.1 involves the advancement of public policy.
The Commission notes that although this Rule establishes and recommends the provision of pro
bono legal services, the Rule itself is not intended to be enforced through a disciplinary process.
Therefore, the Commission finds that any private gain that may accrue to the disadvantaged person
represented by a government attorney acting under the State Bar sponsored pro bono project
would not be the type of private gain prohibited by WV Code 6B-2-5-(b)(1).
There are, of course, some limitations to the type of pro bono cases which the government
attorneys may litigate. For example, West Virginia Code 6B-2-5(f) would prohibit a public
employee from representing a client, even without compensation, in a particular matter in which the
public servant personally and substantially participated in a decision-making, advisory or staff
support capacity on behalf of his employing State agency. Also, a staff attorney who has
represented a government agency in a particular matter can not thereafter represent another client in
the same or substantially related matter if that client's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the governmental agency.
Further, West Virginia Code 6B-2-5(g)(1) provides that during the duration of the public service or
for a period of six months after the termination of public service, a full-time staff attorney may not
appear in a representative capacity before the governmental entity which he served. This provision
is applicable only to those governmental agencies which are authorized to hear contested cases or
promulgate regulations.
Although any pro bono activities engaged in by government attorneys would support the provision
of legal services to the disadvantaged and would serve to advance public policy goals, these
activities may never interfere with government attorneys' timely completion of all government job
responsibilities. The Commission finds that insuring that pro bono activity by government lawyers
does not impede prompt attention to government work is not an ethical question but rather a matter
for management supervision within the agency.
Further, attorneys may be required to make up the time spent on a pro bono case if the case
required attention during regular work hours. Most attorneys are professional rather than hourly
employees. As such, the flexibility in their work schedule may allow the attorney to compensate the
public agency for any time spent on a pro bono case during the normal work day, provided the
employing agency consents to this arrangement.
The Commission notes that agencies are free to impose stricter standards on employees than those
contained in the Ethics Act. Government attorneys desiring to meet their professional responsibility
to provide pro bono services must first check with the appropriate agency official to ensure that the
proposed activity will not be contrary to any agency policy and that the activity is undertaken in a
manner that complies with agency guidelines.
De minimis use of public resources for pro bono cases would not be considered a substantial,
material violation of the Ethics Act. See 158 CSR 6-4 and 6-5.2. However, approval of any
specific uses of these resources must be left to the policies of the specific agency involved. Each
agency is free to determine, in light of its resources, priorities, and activities, what would constitute
an improper use of its public resources.
Prosecuting Attorneys' Conflicts in Private Practice
On July 2, 1996, the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the recommendation of a Hearing Panel
Subcommittee and ordered that a former prosecuting attorney be sanctioned for violations of State
ex. rel. Bailey v. Facemire, 413 S.E.2d 183 (W.Va. 1991), by representing private clients in a
domestic relations matter when allegations of criminal conduct have been made or a domestic
violence order had been issued. The Subcommittee wrote the following report in order to give
prosecuting attorneys and their assistants more guidance on this subject matter:
DECISION OF THE LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BOARD
IN RE: C. WALKER FERGUSON, IV, member I.D. 93-01-245
of The West Virginia State Bar
This mater was brought on for hearing on December 13, 1995, after being duly matured and notice
being given to all parties. At that time the Office of Disciplinary Counsel was represented by Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, Sherri D. Goodman, and the Respondent, Charles Walker Ferguson, IV,
was present in person and by his counsel David J. Lockwood.
After listening to several of the witnesses, the parties conferred and announced to the
Subcommittee that an agreement had been reached with regard to the charges filed herein with
respect to violations and recommended discipline. At that time the Subcommittee listened to the
proposed stipulation of the parties and after considering the same, the Subcommittee was of the
opinion that the proposed stipulation of the parties was fair and reasonable considering the interest
of the Bar, the Respondent and the public. Accordingly, the stipulation of the Respondent admitting
that there were violations of Rule 1.16(a)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct is accepted and
made part of this Decision herein as Exhibit. Further, the stipulation that the sanction to be imposed
would be pro bono representation by the Respondent in six (6) meaningful cases referred from the
Judicare pro bono program or referral from a legal services organization including the Public
Defenders Office is likewise accepted by the Subcommittee.
It was further requested by the parties that the Subcommittee set forth in its Decision criteria for
guidance to part-time prosecutors in this State and the potential for conflicts of interest. This
request seemed appropriate because it was obvious to the Subcommittee that the Respondent had
not specifically intended to violate Rule 1.16(a)(1), but that the violations had occurred through the
Respondent's failure to appreciate the potential for conflicts of interest arising when a part-time
prosecutor represents private litigants in domestic relations matters and for his failing to take
remedial actions as promptly as practical.
The Subcommittee recognizes that the rules regarding conflict of interest as it relates to part-time
prosecutors and the representation of private clients is both complex and varied. Two excellent
articles which set forth the various problems which confront part-time prosecutors and how various
jurisdictions have handled the same may be found in a very thorough article on this subject by
Professor Richard H. Underwood of the University of Kentucky College of Law and an article by
former Chairman of the West Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics John O. Kiser.
Professor Underwood's article appears in the Kentucky Law Journal in Volume 81, Page 1
(1992-93) and Mr. Kiser's article is contained in the West Virginia Law Review, Volume 79,
Number 3, page 367 (1977). Both of these articles are excellent sources for any prosecutor who
wishes to review the law in other jurisdictions and to find specific examples of how ethics
committees and the courts have handled almost any type of situation. Professor Underwood's
article alone contains more than 465 footnotes with numerous citations in each footnote.
The problem that confronted the Respondent in this case was that while engaged as a part-time
prosecutor for Wayne County, West Virginia, he also conducted a private practice which included
representation of individuals in domestic relations matters. It is clear that one of the most fruitful
areas for conflict of interest of a part-time prosecutor is where such part-time prosecutor attempts
to have a domestic relations practice. This is true because domestic relations law often times results
in conduct by one of the parties which eventually involves the local prosecuting attorney's office
which thus creates the conflict of interest. State ex. rel. Bailey v. Facemire, 413 S.E.2d 183
(W.Va. 1991); State ex. rel. McClanahan v. Hamilton, 430 S.E.2d 569 (W.Va. 1993). If there is
any area of private practice where a part-time prosecutor should pause and consider carefully
before accepting a private client, it is in the area of domestic relations practice. Not only is the
potential ripe for future problems to evolve between the spouses which will require participation by
the prosecuting attorney's office, but without a thorough debriefing and record check, a part-time
prosecutor may be violating Rule 1.16(a)(1) without actually knowing it.
Justice Workman set forth in the Facemire case the requirement that all potential or actual conflicts
of interest be identified and that reasonable efforts be undertaken to make this determination. Those
reasonable efforts were described by Justice Workman as entailing Aa review of pertinent records
in the prosecuting attorney's office and other court records to ascertain whether a party to the
subject or prospective litigation has filed a petition pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence
Act . . . [or] a petition alleging failure to pay child support, or has initiated any other civil or criminal
proceeding which has the potential of involving the prosecutor's office for enforcement purposes. Id
Syl. Pt. 2. Such a review is a daunting task and not one that most part-time prosecutors would
want to undertake before accepting such representation. Perhaps part-time prosecutors engaging in
this type of private representation should prepare a questionnaire to be completed by the
prospective client before the initial interview. Such a questionnaire would support one's efforts of
reasonable investigation as required by Facemire. However, if such reasonable investigation is not
made prior to accepting such representation, and a conflict arises because of some conduct which
has occurred prior to the acceptance of such representation, the Lawyer Disciplinary Board may
be justified in viewing such conduct by the part-time prosecutor as reckless. Thus rising such
conduct to a higher level indicating a greater degree of punishment.
The rational for such policy is obvious as it is to no one's interest, especially the public's, if, in fact, a
married couple are assaulting each other or engaging in other unlawful conduct and the public
officer in charged with criminally pursuing such matters undertakes an attorney/client relationship
with one of the offending parties. In fact, it is problematic whether a part-time prosecutor should
engage in any confidential communications with a prospective client until he or she has at least
initially satisfied him or herself that there has been no conduct by either spouse which would or
could involve the prosecuting attorney's office in a criminal matter or some other enforcement
proceeding or otherwise.
Based upon a review of the case law and the scholarly articles, all of which interpret the Rules of
Professional Conduct, general principles can be set forth relating to this subject matter.
First, there are competing interests at stake, such as the effective representation of the public in
matters reposed to the prosecuting attorney's office, and the interest in attracting competent
attorneys to work as prosecutors or assistant prosecutors, especially in areas where monetary
restraints preclude having full-time prosecutors and their staffs. However, even understanding this, it
must be reiterated that the duties of the prosecutor or an assistant prosecutor are paramount and
take precedence over any private employment and thus, Aany private employment which is in any
way inconsistent with or antagonistic to the prosecuting attorney's statutorily imposed responsibility
is improper and should be avoided. The [prosecuting or assistant prosecuting] attorney must avoid
actual conflicts or those in which the interests may, with some reasonable degree of probability,
become conflicting. Legal Ethics Inquiry 86-3. Although there are no doubt domestic relations
matters which would not demonstrate Asome reasonable degree of probability@ of involving the
prosecutor's office and thus becoming a conflict, it is obvious that many do impose such risks and it
is the obligation of the prosecutor to make this initial determination before accepting any private
representation thus the potential for problem is real.
Secondly, if a conflict arises after private employment has been accepted by either the elected
prosecuting attorney or any assistant then withdrawal from the private client's legal matter is
mandatory. For instance, if a potential criminal matter is raised in a civil matter which the prosecutor
or any assistant is representing the private litigation, then withdrawal from the civil matter by the
prosecutor or the assistant is required. Whether the prosecutor's office is also disqualified from
handling the criminal case or other matter which the office is statutorily required to handle that gave
rise to the conflict, must be determined by reference to other Rules of Professional Conduct with
particular attention to Rule 1.10 and 1.11. Whether screening is appropriate under any particular
circumstances is a matter to be determined on a case by case basis. However, Legal Ethics Inquiry
92-01 determined that if the elected prosecutor him or herself is disqualified for any reason then
that disqualification is imputed to the entire office. The pertinent portion of that Legal Ethics Inquiry
states as follows:
AIn the interest of fairness to the defendant and public confidence in the impartiality of a
prosecution, the Committee believes that when a [elected or appointed] Prosecuting Attorney is
disqualified for any reason, that disqualification is imputed to the entire office. When an assistant is
disqualified for any reason, he/she may be screened from participation in the matter, and other
assistants or the Prosecuting Attorney may represent the State.
Thus if the prosecuting attorney who is permitted to engage in private practice, accepts a private
client and it later develops that a conflict of interest arises which requires withdrawal by the
prosecutor then that prosecutor's entire office is disqualified from prosecuting the criminal matter or
otherwise representing the interests of the State because of the supervisory authority of the
prosecutor over all of his or her assistants.
Lastly, whether a conflict of interest arises with the prosecutor's public responsibilities as it relates
to any private client must still be determined based upon the particular facts of any given situation
when the matter giving rise to the conflict may be unrelated to the current private representation.
For instance, where a part-time assistant prosecutor is representing a private client in some oil and
gas property work and that client is arrested for DUI, obviously the assistant part-time prosecutor
could not prosecute his private client for the DUI charge but whether the assistant must withdraw
from the oil and gas property matter would depend on an application of the criteria set forth in the
McClanahan case. However, if the oil and gas client is represented by the elected or appointed
prosecutor there would be the requirement that a special prosecutor from another county
investigate and prosecute the case.
Finally, the prosecuting attorney is each county, whether that prosecutor be full-time or part-time
under the law of this State, should establish guidelines within his or her office to make the assistants
aware of these ethical obligations if in fact the assistants are going to be permitted to engage in the
private practice of law while also representing the public interest as assistant prosecutors.
Obviously, not all factual situations can be explored in this Decision but the criteria set forth herein
may be of some benefit to prosecuting attorneys and their staffs throughout the State. In the
proceeding involved in this case, it was disputed as to whether there had been adequate
dissemination to prosecuting attorneys and their staff throughout the State, of the Lawyer
Disciplinary Counsel's position with respect to conflicts of interest. Although the Facemire case was
obviously available to any prosecutor and his or her staff, there was some argument and testimony
with respect to whether certain seminars presented to the Prosecuting Attorneys Association were
attended by the Respondent. Perhaps it would be of some benefit to circulate this Decision so that
the references cited herein would be available to all prosecutors and their assistants.
Accordingly, it is the decision of the Subcommittee to accept the stipulation of the parties and to
therefore order that, with respect to the Respondent Charles Walker Ferguson, IV, that the
committee finds that he did violate Rule 1.16(a)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by his
representation of domestic relations clients after a conflict of interest had arisen between the private
domestic relations client and the Respondent in review of his duties as a public prosecutor. It is
further ordered that the appropriate sanction for this violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which the Subcommittee does not believe was intentional, is that the Respondent undertake, on a
pro bono basis, six (6) meaningful cases through the Judicare program or a referral from a legal
services organization including the Public Defenders Office. These pro bono representations should
be accomplished within one year from the date of this Decision and any pro bono cases undertaken
or completed since the date of this hearing shall be considered towards completion of this part of
the sanction.
It is further ordered that all costs of this disciplinary proceeding be assessed against the Respondent
and be paid within sixty days after the Respondent receives the same. Disciplinary Counsel will
submit a certificate of expenses detailing such items and if there is any objection such objection
should be made to the Subcommittee chairman within fifteen days after receipt of the same.
This decision is being filed with the Clerk of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and it is
requested that he send a certified copy to all counsel of record and to the Respondent.
David J. Romano, Esq.
Elizabeth Rose, Esq.
Priscilla Haden
Revised: September 26, 1996
Send Comments to: pettyc@technet.wvbar.org
The West Virginia State Bar
All contents copyright (C) 1995, The WV State Bar. All rights reserved.