Admiralty & Maritime Law:
Some Questions & Answers for the West Virginia Lawyer
By Frederick B. Goldsmith*

Q: I thought that to practice admiralty & maritime law you needed deep water ports, and that means places like New Orleans, Houston, and New York?
A: No.
West Virginia has "navigable waterways," including the Ohio, Monongahela, Kanawha, and Big Sandy Rivers, which is a large part of what one needs to practice admiralty and maritime law. The term "navigable waterway" is a term of art in admiralty and maritime practice. Navigable waters of the United States are those which "form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries...." Doran v. Lee, 287 F.Supp. 807 (W.D.Pa.1968)(citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871)).
Q: When will admiralty & maritime law apply to a tort case?
A: Generally, the requirements are navigable waters, a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, and a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
For admiralty and maritime law to apply to a tort, the tort must first occur on navigable waters, see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S.Ct. 619 (1996)(teenager killed when her rented jet ski struck an anchored barge), or, if the casualty occurs on land, it must be "caused by a vessel on navigable water." The Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C.A. App. §740 (West Supp.1999); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (1995). Next, the court must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, supra. Finally, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id. See also Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S.Ct. 2892 (1990); Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 102 S.Ct. 2654 (1982); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 93 S.Ct. 493 (1972).
Thus, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction will generally obtain in personal injury actions brought by those aboard vessels operating on navigable waters or when there is a collision on the rivers between commercial and/or recreational vessels (e.g., barges, towboats, passenger carrying excursion boats, and/or pleasure boats, including personal watercraft). Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction will also obtain when a vessel on navigable waters strikes a fixed object, such as a dock or bridge pier, an event referred to as an "allision." See, e.g., Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 198 (5th Cir.1995)(barge striking gas production platform in Gulf of Mexico).
Q: When will admiralty & maritime law apply to a contract case?
A: Generally, the contract must relate to a ship in its use as such, or to commerce or navigation on navigable waters, or to transportation by sea or to maritime employment.
The test for admiralty and maritime contract jurisdiction is not as not as easy to articulate as that for admiralty and maritime tort jurisdiction. Maritime law has its own version of Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" line in his concurrence in the obscenity case, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964). Justice Harlan, writing in Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 890 (1961), opined that "[t]he boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts--as opposed to torts or crimes- -being
conceptual rather than spatial, have always been difficult to draw." One venerable maritime law treatise informs that a maritime contract must "relate to a ship in its use as such, or to commerce or navigation on navigable waters, or to transportation by sea or to maritime employment." 1 Benedict on Admiralty §183 at 11-6, 11-7 (7th Ed.1987).
Q: What is the maritime case I am most likely to encounter?
A: That of a Jones Act seaman.
Q: Who will qualify as a Jones Act seaman?
A: Generally, regular crewmen aboard commercial vessels.
The term "Jones Act seaman" is derived from the federal statute bearing this name and codified at 46 U.S.C.App. §688. The Jones Act affords a "seaman," a term the act does not define, the right to sue his employer. Seamen generally include regular crewmen aboard commercial vessels, such as masters, mates, pilots, deckhands, cooks, and engineers. They may work aboard towboats, barges, dredges, or passenger excursion boats. Even regular waitresses and bar tenders aboard commercial vessels may qualify as seamen.
Q: Is there anything special about representing a "seaman"?
A: Yes. Most significantly, seamen are not covered by workers comp and a pure comparative negligence scheme applies.
Seamen are a unique class of worker. Unlike most land-based workers, seamen are not covered by any state or Federal workers' compensation scheme. Also, a pure comparative negligence scheme applies to maritime torts, rather than the modified comparative negligence rule applicable to West Virginia negligence claims, which holds that where a plaintiff's contributory negligence is equal to or above 50 percent of the combined negligence of the parties to the accident, he is barred from recovery. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W.Va.1979). A plaintiff in a maritime tort action may recover even if 99% negligent. The plaintiffs damages will, however, be proportionately reduced. See 46 U.S.C. § 688; United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S.Ct. 1708 (1975); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122, 56 S.Ct. 707 (1936); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 11 S.Ct. 29 (1890).
Q: What personal injury claims may be brought by a "seaman" against his employer?
A: Seamen may generally bring three claims for personal injuries suffered on the job: (1) a Jones Act negligence claim, (2) a general maritime law unseaworthiness claim, and (3) a general maritime law maintenance and cure claim.

*Frederick B. Goldsmith, who offices in Pittsburgh, is a 1990 graduate of Tulane Law School, a former federal judicial clerk, and a frequent author and speaker on admiralty & maritime law. He is a Proctor Member of the Maritime Law Association of the United States and is admitted to the West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Texas bars. Mr. Goldsmith may be reached at (412) 434-7575, (877) 977-7575, fred@towboatlaw.com, or via his firm's web site, www.towboatlaw.com.
